1. In discussing with you today some of the problems of the conflict in South Vietnam, I feel no need to re-cover the fundamental issues dealt with by President Johnson in his address of April 7: such matters as our overall goals and stakes in South Vietnam and Southeast Asia, our attitude on discussions with the Communist Bloc, or the full range of our political, economic and social objectives. Coming from the Department of Defense and addressing this particular audience, it seems appropriate for me to spend my limited time considering some questions and issues relating to our military programs in that area. Specifically, I wish to discuss the motives and implications of two recent aspects of our programs: (1) the U.S. and Vietnamese air strikes against selected targets in North Vietnam; and (2) the deployment of some US combat units to South Vietnam, along with increased support personnel and with the use of US aircraft in direct combat support within South Vietnam.

Why were these steps needed: at this particular time? What is expected of them? What might they achieve that earlier measures have not, or could not?

In his April speech, President Johnson defined our intentions in South Vietnam concisely: "Our objective is the independence of South Vietnam and its freedom from attack...We will do everything necessary to reach that objective, and we will do only what is absolutely necessary."

In the case of these two particular measures--air strikes against North Vietnam and the commitment of U.S. combat troops--the President's reluctance to employ them until convinced of their absolute necessity hardly needs explanation. Each of them involves Presidential responsibilities of the highest magnitude: the hazarding of American lives, the risk of widening a war.

The first question is, then, what produced that conviction? What is new in the situation that required such measures? The goals at issue are not new, either for the North Vietnamese or the Chinese Communists or the South Vietnamese or the US. Nor has their been a change

Nor has there been a change in the basic tactics of the Communists: subversion, assassination and kidnapping, sabotage, ambushes and guerrilla attacks, infiltration and external support.

1. What is new in the situation to require these measures? The goals at issue are not new, either of the DRV or the CC or the GVN or the US. The basic tactics of the Communists--subversion, terrorism, infiltration, and external support, guerrilla warfare--xxx have not changed.

2. What is new xxxx is, first, that the main force units of the Viet Cong--their well-trained, well-equipped, full-time regulars in organized combat units--must now be estimated to number at least 38,000, and quite possibly 50,000 or more; and their irregular forces at 100,000. Second, what is new is the rate at which this force buildup has been fed, and is being increased, by organized infiltration from North Vietnam. Our knowledge of the scale of infiltration must await the commitment of new units to combat and the taking xxxxx and interrogation of prisoners; inevitably, xxx recognition of an increased scale has lagged behind the event. But our earlier estimate, based on a rate of 4000-7000 infiltrators in the first half of 1964, that over 10,000 infiltrators would arrive xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx during 1964 now looks conservative.

Moreover, an increasing proportion of the infiltrators--perhaps 75% of all those in 1964--xx consists of young ethnic Northerners, draftees inducted into infiltration units, rather than Southerners who had been ordered North by the Viet Minh in 1954. These recruits are, in fact, less formidable than the seasoned guerrilla fighters or technicians from the South, but their use shows unmistakably the intent of the North Vietnamese regime to keep up or increase the present rate of infiltration, even after the supply of "regrouped" Southerners has dried up.

Even more ominously, there are reports, and some confirming evidence, that some organized combat units of the North Vietnamese regular xxxxx army have begun to appear in the northern provinces of South Vietnam.

Continued infiltration on this xxxxx magnitude would be fatal to the independence of South Vietnam. Indeed, xxx xxxxxxxxxxxxx present guerrilla forces xxxxx of 150,000 are already too much to handle for the present South Vietnamese Armed Forces of _____ (250,000 regulars and 450,000 paramilitary and police), if they xxx were to provide security for citizens and officials and hamlets throughout SVN. Yet in areas where it cannot provide adequate security, the government of South Vietnam Forx reasons I shall discuss presently, a far greater preponderance of governmental force is needed to meet the challenge posed by guerrilla forces.

Two conclusions follow. It is essential that the manpower balance within South Vietnam be shifted radically in favor of the government forces. And it is essential that the flow of personnel, support and direction from North Vietnam be radically reduced.

Considering both immediate and indirect effects, <u>each</u> of these goals requires <u>both</u> of the measures we are discussing: increased personnel, in the short run at least, from outside SVN; and xxx air strikes against selected targets in NVN. The reasoning behind this conclusion involves some of the most important and least commonly understood features of the war being waged by North Vietnam.

Need for preponderance of governmental forces

A. Commonly heard rule that government forces need a superiority of 10 or 15 to master the threat posed by guerrilla forces and terrorists. Partly reflects actual experience in countries where insurgencies have been successfully suppressed; e.g., Malaya. But follows directly from the nature of the guerrilla challenge.

B. Most fundamental claim of a governmental structure, whether democratically derived or not, to authority and to compliance with its needs, including taxes, military manpower and cooperation with its representatives, is its ability to provide physical security for its representatives and citizens. Since goal of insurgency is to destroy the authority and control of an existing government so as to substitute another, the basic step in the Communist technique is to demonstrate the government's inability to provide security. The demonstrations begin in remote, rural areas where the law-enforcement arm of the government is, in fact, weakest and slowest. The demonstrations consist of assassinations and kidnappings. By concentrating on local officials, and by beginning with unpopular ones, the terrorists achieve three purposes at once. They dramatise the weakness, or remoteness, or lethargy, of the central government in terms of its inability to protect its own officials; they actually destroy the government's presence in the area and contact with the rural population by killing or kidnapping its most active and effective representatives; and they may even acquire some credit as the settlers of local grudges, At the same time they demonstrate their own ruthlessness and total commitment: a lesson that is not lost upon those from whom they demand "taxes" or labor or information, nor upon those who would be tempted to carry complaints to the government or information to the government forces. As the reputation of their deeds spreads, the guerrillas are able to use local residents relatively openly to collect funds for them, to propagandize, to recruit, to inform on officials, programs, opponents and the movement of government troops. Thus a "civilian," administrative, political arm of the insurgency evolves, protected from betrayal and supported in its demands by the"strongarm" guerrillas, who are in turn supported and informed by the efforts of these representatives in place.

This is the process that the Hanoi regime called into play in South Vietnam. It is the process that is beginning right now in Thailand,with assassinations of rural officials, simultaneous with bland statements in Peking that Thailand is ripe for insurgency. In South Vietnam the assassinations began in earnest in mid-1957, and grew steadily through 1959. In 1960, Communist terrorists assassinated or kidnapped over 3000 local officials, military personnel and civilians. In 1964, 436 civic officials were murdered--an average of 36 a month--They died by knives, by pistol shots in their bedrooms in the middle of the night, by sniper's bullets; and in any cases their wives and children were murdered with them. In the same year, 1131 civic officials were kidnapped; and aside from civic officials, 1359 South Vietnamese civilians---government sympathizers, informers, non-cooperators with the VC--were assassinated and 8423 civilians were kidnapped or captured.

This bleeding and intimidation of the governmental structure in South Vietnam has gone on for eight years; and it goes on today, brutal and selective as ever. In March of this year, 36 civic officials were murdered, and 92 other civilians.

[illegible] of them - the single province of Phuoc Tuy - when the Communist were attempting to eliminate governmental authority

The rate of terrorism rose sharply to its present level between 1963 and 1964, from about 700 incidents a month through most of 1963 to a range between 1500 and 2000 a month in 1964. Figures like these are as hard to comprehend as national budget totals; but what we are talking about, for a single month, is 2000 separate acts of violence--assassinations, bombings, kidnappings--against unarmed civilians.

One of the major obstacles to pursuing the war against the guerrillas should be clear by this point: the difficulty of acquiring intelligence from local peasants on the guerrilla movements, and the abundance of information the guerrillas achieve. No sympathy for the guerrillas is required, no ideological allegiance, no hatred for the government; just a decent respect for one's skin. to provide information and taxes and sons to the guerrillas:

What are the force requirements for combatting this organized terror? One authority has put the problem concisely:

> "The insurgent blows up a bridge, so every bridge has to be guarded; he throws a grenade in a movie theater, so every person entering a public place has to be searched. When the insurgent burns a farm, all the farmers clamor for protection; if they do not receive it, they may be tempted to deal privately with the insurgent, as happened in Indochina and Algeria...Because the counterinsurgent cannot escape the responsibility for maintaining order, the ratio of expenses between him and the insurgent is high." (Galula, p. 11). It may be ten or twenty to one, or higher."

Not only must the government forces tie down troops and police defending the most important facilities; but it must have quick reaction forces in regional reserves, if they are to limit the guerrillas to hit-and-run attacks; and to seek out and destroy an elusive enemy who had no responsibilities to defend territory or people and can choose to evade battle, they must invest massive efforts in searching and encircling operations.

All of this is beyond the reach of an army that outnumbers its opponents only 4:1 or less, as the regular and paramilitary forces of SVN do today. The result can only be the temporary abandonment of some regions to the guerrilla forces and their political arm.

A. How to redress the manpower imbalance.

1. GVN draft and recruiting: 160,000 increase planned (but lag in acquiring, training).
2. Stretch manpower--by increased mobility--and make it more effective--by close air support--and substitute airpower--by independent strikes.
3. Induce VC defections.
4. Improve "balance of morale" and relative fighting effectiveness.
5. Improve efficiency of use and effectiveness of ARVN forces by maximum US support personnel: logistics, communications, enginners, planning.
6. Release ARVN units for offensive employment by deploying U.S. combat units.
7. Induce DRV to pull out cadres, combat units; reduce support, direction.

B. Three of these items, relating to operations within SVN, are sensitively affected by air strikes against NVN: (1), (3), (4). By acting on the "balance of morale"--the confidence of each local party in its principal ally, and the hope that the other's ally will tire--the strikes affect favorably the relative rates of defection, of recruiting, and of effectiveness. (for (7), see below, D.)

Though too soon to draw conclusions, the rates for March are encouraging:

(a) 10,000 ARVN recruits, higher than goals, highest gains since November, 1964: two-thirds volunteers.
(b) In the first week in April, 129 defections of VC military personnel and 23 political cadre; the highest weekly rate since statistics started in January, 1964.
(c) In the first week in April, 643 VC killed to 135 ARVN; for several weeks in succession, favorable rate of weapons captured.
(d) Four large VC arms caches--one including 7 tons of ammunition--captured without VC opposition.

C. The role and importance of infiltration, support and direction from NVN: the need to reduce it.

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D. The means of reducing DRV infiltration, support and guidance.

1. Air strikes alone will not do it, so long as DRV leaders smell victory: so long as they see "light at the end of the tunnel."

2. Hence, actions within SVN must be adequate to deny them such early hopes.
3. Given their conviction that the remaining struggle must be long, at best, continuing air strikes may become a significant influence. They impose--for the first time--significant costs and risks on their operations in the South (and a longer-run warning to the Chicoms). It has been easy for Communist leaders to be patient in their approach and to take a long view when all the heavy costs and casualties were being absorbed by their victims. With a more equal distribution of pain, we can see who is more patient. They are more fanatic; but they are poorer.

E. At this stage in our counterinsurgency operations in South Vietnam, the only way to start winning is to stop losing. Better intelligence, recruiting, defections, fighting spirit, all lie on the other side of that hill. Together, these two approaches..

1. We do not expect the rulers of North Vietnam to stop infiltration and support and direction of the conflict in SVN--to give up their working goal of a generation--in response to a dozen or two raids of the sort we have conducted so far.

2. We do not expect raids on bridges, ammo depots and bases, in the southern DRV and even throughout the DRV, to eliminate their capability to support the guerrilla war in the South.

3. Even less do we expect the Chicoms to encourage them to stop on the basis of such raids.

4. These raids impose--for the first time--a cost and a significant risk to their operations in the South. They give the North--for the first time--a reason to worry, and a reason to quit. By the same token, they give the VC in the South a reason to worry that the Northerners will quit, a reason to doubt that the long hardships of the guerrilla life must eventually, with outside support, win out. They confront the Communist Chinese with the new prospect that the responsibilities and commitments that go with the encouragement of the North Vietnamese campaign can involve them in the choice between humiliation and utmost risks. And they give all these parties, and the South Vietnamese as well, the strongest evidence of the seriousness of the US commitment and will. All of these effects should grow with time. We, too, can be patient.

5. It is easy to misunderstand the purposes of the bombing if this is regarded as the whole of our policy, or as the only new element in our policy. From that point of view, it would be natural to believe either that we must have deluded ourselves about the potential effectiveness of such strikes as we have conducted, or that we must have resigned ourselves to defeat or to something not far from it, or that we must intend a bombing campaign far more decisive than we have conducted so far: in effect, the prompt obliteration of NVN society.

6. (after 1) In particular, we do not believe the rulers of NVN to give up their objective of ruling the South--even under the impact of longer and heavier attacks than they have received--so long as they feel victory to be near. It is essential that their infiltration and support be reduced or eliminated; and to that end, it is essential that they be convinced that victory is far from imminent. The attacks themselves can contribute to that end, by affecting the "balance of morale" between the VC and the GVN in the South, but they are not enough. The balance of manpower must be affected, and quickly. They propose to increase their regular and paramilitary forces by 160,000...

Variety of methods: a) increase military forces by 160,000;
draft, recruiting (MARSH: 10,000, 2/3 volunteer)

Why, with all the aid that we have given SVN, is it not now capable of resisting subversion by its own efforts?

How have the VC come as close to their goal as they have, confronting a government supported by the resources and expertise of the U.S.?

Why do we put such emphasis on the role of infiltration, since the VC remain predominantly Southern and numerically inferior to the ARVN?

Does not the strength of the VC imply a superior popular appeal--a democratic charter to run the government?

How do we propose to win back lost ground? What do we hope will win for us when past approaches have failed?

Is not conflict within SVN primarily political? What is the role of military measures?

What is it that we hope to achieve: a) by hitting the North; b) by U.S. manpower?

Why have we changed the rules? Why have we now, and not earlier, taken actions that risk a wider war we do not seek?

Why would the DRV/CC/VC crumple under pressure when they have so much reason to feel near victory in the South?

Is the ARVN willing to fight? Do the SVNese/GVN really care?

Is the infiltration and support really critical?

Could the DRV reduce the pressure? (It could stop shipping in arms and ammunition by the ton. It could stop supplying Chicom ammo for the Chicom weapons the main force units are primarily supplied with. It could stop supplying squad leaders and battalion commanders and radiomen, weapons technicians.... It could stop mobilising and training and sending thousands of Northern draftees for duty in the South. It could pull out the Northern infiltration units, members of the PAVN and led by Northern officers. It could give new orders--either to come back or to lay down their arms--to those "regroupees" who obediently travelled north in 1954, who spent five or six years in the North Vietnamese Army or in a state farm, who were ordered back to duty in the South in 1959 or 1960 or 1961.

1. What ~~would~~ is it that the VC/DRV/CC want? What would victory mean for them?

X "What is the US after? What are we trying to achieve?"
What is it that these critics want? What would they regard as acceptable?
What does the VC/DRV/CC want?

a. To govern all of VN as a Communist dictatorship;
b. To gain access to the food supplies of the South;
c. To dominate Laos and Cambodia;
d. To flank Thailand and pursue "war of liberation."
e. To demonstrate US impotence against their tactics.
f. To win adherents and prestige and influence in Comm Bloc, against Soviets; to win wuppport for Chicom expansionist line.
g. To secure allegiance of Indonesia; press Phillippines, India; establish "wave of the future."
h. To promote instability worldwide; to prepare way to extend influence in Africa and Latin America.

Which of these ends is Q "acceptable" to the US? Where would those who would accept the loss of SVN draw the line? Why there--and not later--or earlier?

We say: the time is now, the place is here. With the support of a brave people, large, good army; ~~with~~ with terrian of Svn; not after loss.
How do the DRV expect to win?
By tiring the U.S.;
By tiring the SVNese:
By convincing the SVNese that the US will withdraw, that they should make the best personal deals they can, refrain from committing themselves;
By demonstrating GVN/US impotence to provide security; by expanding their control, by infiltrating and encouraging separatism and political strife.

When will the GVN have won? When it can provide security for its people and its officials, and can carry out its programs. When local police forces can root out rival, subversive "governments," without punishment from guerrilla bands. When the VC main force units have gone back to NVN, or been killed and captured, or have disbanded, or have been won over to the government side (as in Phillippines). When security plus positive government programs have won public support: intelligence, cooperation, recruting, taxes, refusal to pay taxes or support or enlist in the VC. When NVN has stopped sending units, direction, support, personnel.

Problems not over when NVN stops: VC strength in SVN, rival government. Need to pursue "resurgency"; combat elements, win papular support. We can help, and our help will be needed; though we cannot do whole job.
We can: a) Convince NVN that it must pay stiff price for supporting; b)
b) Make infiltration and support much more difficult (though not impossible); both land and sea.
c) By actions in SVN, convince NVN that task will be impossible (or very long).
(Each of these would be a major change in NVN calculations; note that they have always expected quick victory) (have paid no price; have had--not easy--but unopposed entry into SVN).
~~d~~)
d) Change the balance of morale in SVN; keep the VC from seeing light at the end of their tunnel.

Coming from the

Questions have been raised about our attitude on negotiation discussions and negotiations with the Communist Bloc, about our overall goals and stakes in Southeast Asia, and about the scope and objectives of our non-military programs. Each of these subjects has x@thers have dealt with each of which should have been answered President Johnson's speech of April 7 should have answered many of these questions. Combing from the Department of Defense, and addressing this particular audience, it seems appropriate for me to spend my limited time with you considering the narrower question of the role and objectives of our military programs. More specifically Even more specifically, I shall discuss the issues associated with four elements in our military program that are reasonably described as new: 1) US air strikes, and US support of SVN air strikes, against military targets in NVN; 2) use of US airpower in direct combat support within SVN; 3) significant increases in US support personnel; 4) deployment of US and Allied combat units.

Why were these steps necessary now? Will they be enough?

2) deployment of US and Allied combat units to SVN, along with increases in US supporting personnel and use of US airpower within SVN in direct air support.

Why should it be necessary to send American boys

It can be taken for granted that neither of these actions was taken casually, without the most intense examination of alternatives and risks. Each of them raises Presidential responsibilities of the highest order of importance: the commitment of American lives in combat, and the risks of widening a war.

How do we propose to win?
First step is to stop losing.
How can we stop losing; what haven't we tried? ARVN hasn't kept up with infiltration

~~Stop infiltration~~	
Security	Psywar/information
Manpower	Gov programs
Infiltration	

Support: weapons from outside; (FIGURES ON SOURCES OF ARMS).
We can: work on NVN, infiltration directly;
release ARVN manpower
support expansion
stretch manpower: mobility, firepower, air support
demonstrate US commitment, staying power, willingness to risk

(psychological effects of DRV support, on SVNese and VC)

Those who say: Don't worry about SEA, we have the Seventh Fleet. For <u>what</u> do we have the Seventh Fleet--if not to help our friends defend themselves, if not to stop the spread of Communist dictatorships over another 250 million people?

Lack of VC popular program: popular support for VC. "civil administration" COSVN
VC strategy: a) assassinations, terror, sabotage; b) infrastructure: taxes, propaganda, information, recruiting; c) guerrillas; d) infiltration, support; e) PAVN regular units.

What is a victory for US? Eisenhower goal. That hasn't changed. Those who keep asking, "What are we after?" must be waiting to hear that we have changed that goal, lowered our sights--that something less would be acceptable.
Why should we? Because the costs of a VC victory are less than they appeared to be? ~~Mexxx~~ Because the tide has been going against us? If that is all it takes to discourage the US and cause it to cut its losses--that demonstration would be worth more to the Communist Bloc than ~~xxx~~ the gain of SVN real estate.
It is just what the DRV/CC hopes to prove.

Fighting to win people; to gain control, allegiance, adequate for peaceful administration, with help of police, not troops.

What do we expect: from strikes; from internal programs.
(We <u>don't</u> expect leaders in Hanoi to

The Communists want to make the world believe that what is happening in the last six years in South Vietnam is the spontaneous uprising of an oppressed population. But this is not a what they call "war of national liberation" but a carefully planned operation to take over South Vietnam and to discredit in the eyes of the world the value of [redacted] American help in the defense of freedom.

It is established fact that after France accepted the partition of Vietnam at the 1954 Geneva conference, the Communist leadership in Vietnam ordered tens of thousands of their followers to go North of the 17th parallel in preparation for the eventual conquest of South Vietnam. These men were given military training and intensive political indoctrination over a period of several years. They were then infiltrated into South Vietnam through a network of well organized relay stations, to be assigned to the various tasks required for the creation of the so-called "insurgency" which

is plaguing South Vietnam.

Violence is applied systematically against the defenseless civilian population of South Vietnam and against the authorities of that long-suffering country for the purpose of breaking their will to resist conquest from the North. Doctrine, strategy, and tactics are developed in Hanoi and transmitted to the highly disciplined Viet Cong combat forces in the South. This novel form of aggression has nothing in common with a popular uprising. Therefore common sense is not a reliable guide in countering the Viet Cong insurgency.

What is needed is a thorough understanding of the problem we face. In South Vietnam today a small minority in an otherwise peaceful population has been conditioned by lengthy indoctrination to carry out the orders of ruthless leaders. At first they used assassination on an unprecedented scale to disrupt the local administration established by

the government of the Republic of Vietnam. They then established a clandestine Communist shadow government to terrorize the villagers and exact from them taxes, intelligence and levies of young men and women for the Communist irregular forces. In due course regular military units were established supplied increasingly by land and sea from the stores of the rulers in Hanoi.

The gunners shooting down planes and helicopters are not popular insurgents but regular combat soldiers operating in the territory of a sovereign state. The men planting bombs that kill scores of innocent civilians are not isolated anarchists or madmen but members of suicide squads operating under the most rigid military discipline.

Therefore it is not enough to counter their activities with operations of a local character while their headquarters and supply depots North of the 17th parallel

are treated as a sanctuary. The air strikes conducted since early January accept the logical implication of the model form of warfare devised by Asian Communists. They express the refusal of the Free World to accept the notion that aggression by remote control should enjoy a privileged status.

They will continue until the Communist leadership in Hanoi, or at least the less reckless elements in it, are forced to the conclusion that unconventional warfare is as costly as more traditional forms of aggression. It is becoming increasingly evident that despite ~~[illegible]~~ heavy casualties the Viet Cong ~~military campaign in South Vietnam~~ will not be defeated unless the balance of forces in South Vietnam changes. To achieve this two lines of action are necessary: Sustained pressure on the rulers in Hanoi to stop and desist from committing additional forces in South Vietnam and

a substantial increase in the military resources opposing the Viet Cong.

As with organized crime, modern Communist warfare places a heavy burden on the forces of law and order. The aggressors can choose time and place. ~~[illegible]~~ The defenders must be prepared to protect people and territory ~~[illegible]~~ wherever and whenever necessary and to punish the offenders. A Viet Cong unit may engage in combat, after careful preparation, once every four to six months. It is given long periods of time to rest and recuperate. ARVN forces have to secure territory, pursue the enemy, and fight wherever they are attacked. This requires ~~[illegible]~~ not only much longer manpower but also much greater exertion on the part of each unit.

~~Given~~ these circumstances the ARVN forces have fought well, against heavy ~~[illegible]~~

6)

odds. To restore the balance in their favor, we are increasing U.S. support and develop gradually tactics which aim at ~~[illegible]~~ making better use of our material superiority by using air power on a larger scale.

It is a misconception to assume that Viet Cong successes are the result of popular support to an intrinsically weaker combat force. In this kind of warfare the natural advantages of the aggressor are considerable and the populace protects itself by assisting those who appear to be the winning side. It is true that in areas where the population has not experienced Communist rule clever propaganda and utopian promises may create initially a favorable predisposition toward the Viet Cong. But in areas where local Communist rule has been established heavy exactions soon disabuse the villagers and coercion takes the place of voluntary support for the Communist cause.

7)

It is therefore our belief that increasing military pressure on the Viet Cong in the South and on their masters in the North will in time turn the tide. As the President said on April 7 in Baltimore, "our resources are equal to any challenge", and "our patience and determination are unending".

Eventually, the Viet Cong will be defeated and a pacified South Vietnam will be able to proceed to the development of its rich potential for the benefit of its population. It is to be hoped that when that day comes the lessons of the long and cruel campaign in South Vietnam will not escape the attention of the Communist hierarchy in Peking currently laboring under the misconception that they have discovered a form of warfare against which the Free World is helpless. How costly to themselves they intend to make this lesson cannot be determined in advance. But, in time,

they or their successors will be forced to realize that there is no substitute for the rules of decency which must govern relations among nations.